The Question of Hezbollah's Disarmament: A Conversation with Ali Jezzini
al-Mayadeen military analyst Ali Jezzini speaks about the Lebanese government's decision to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025 and why Hezbollah has staked so much against handing over its weapons.
On August 7, the Lebanese cabinet of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, under President Joseph Aoun, approved an American proposal to disarm Hezbollah, handing over its weapons to the Lebanese Army. Such a proposal has been discussed for years, but undertaking such a campaign while Israel still occupies points in southern Lebanon, reconstruction efforts in Israeli-bombarded communities are stalled, and seemingly no plan to confront Israel’s daily strikes on the country, has riled Hezbollah’s supporters and its leadership. Rhetoric from the group escalated sharply over the weekend, with its Secretary-General Naim Qassem, saying of Lebanon that if the government moves against Hezbollah and by extension the larger Shia community, “either it remains and we remain together, or farewell to everything.”
I spoke with al-Mayadeen military analyst and al-Mayadeen English producer Ali Jezzini about the risks of renewed civil strife, what American officials are dictating to the Lebanese government, how the Lebanese Army has fared in previous wars involving Israel, what came of earlier attempts to disarm Palestinian refugee camps in the country, and what Hezbollah fears will happen if they are forcibly disarmed.
The following interview has been edited for clarity and length.
Séamus: I saw more than a few expressions of shock from American friends at the idea that Hezbollah was going to be disarmed, from people who normally follow pretty closely what's happening in the region. Can you detail the current position Hezbollah is in after the ceasefire? Why is the government doing this now when it would have been unthinkable before?
Ali: There has been a plan since after the ceasefire, a gradual plan, to tighten the screw regarding Hezbollah's arms. Hezbollah preferred at the beginning with its allies to postpone the issue, [as] it needs some time to recover, it needs to solve a lot of its internal issues. There is a general public [expression here about] Hezbollah, saying that they got tricked by the government, which is true based on multiple leaks. Since the election of President [Joseph] Aoun, there have been multiple promises that the issues of the Israeli occupation [of parts of south Lebanon], the daily aggressions [by the IDF], are to be solved, even the reconstruction efforts are to be solved before we even discuss the question of arms. But all these promises have been reneged.
The current prime minister [Nawaf Salam], that actually was also the whole tricky situation because the agreement was to relegate the last prime minister [Najib Mikati] to continue his job [forming] a new government. Then within 24 hours, this [new] prime minister was chosen. The problem is that this one is disconnected from having any popular base in Lebanon. Most of the parliamentary groups have been also pressured by foreign forces, Saudi Arabia and the US, to elect this man, so his risk assessment is very different than [past] prime ministers.
It seems that the pressure did mount on the president, on the prime Minister, to finish this whole issue despite the risks that it poses, not [just] foreign risks such as the Israeli [aggression] and maybe even some aggression from Syria, since Tom Barrack, the US envoy, has already hinted at the fact that the Syrians consider Lebanon as their [beach resort] in the sense that it's a part of [Greater] Syria, and we're going to use [the] Syrians against you.
The Israelis have hinted multiple times that they're going to go back at [some] point to military action. But it indicates that [the Lebanese government] has a very, very low risk assessment of the civil strife and even the civil war that could be caused by such decisions. It would seem that either they have been promised either an Israeli intervention or an outside intervention or some foreign support. They're completely disconnected from reality and do believe that the resistance has no popular backing or it lost most of its military armaments.
S: How does Hezbollah's arsenal stack up against the Lebanese Army? Is it still more powerful than the military, even after the ceasefire and the bombardment by the IDF?
A: There are multiple issues with this because the first demand was [from] the Americans during the last period, and the Israelis behind them. [This was to] disarm the resistance from [weapons] that could pose threats against Israel, such as ballistic missiles, [other] kinds of missiles, and drones. These weapons are completely different from the ones that could be used against any force that would disarm the resistance in such circumstances, God forbid, [that] there was civil strife here. So these two issues are disconnected.
[Not to mention] the fact that around 35-40% of the Lebanese army belongs to the Shia sect in Lebanon, which is the sect of the resistance. The ongoing campaign of the president and various social media accounts, various institutions, and whole paid ads that you just can't get enough of when you're even playing YouTube now, are focusing and trying to diverge the issue from being a one against a political party, which is Hezbollah, to being against the whole Shia sect, which reinforces the social cohesion and the solidarity within. It does indicate that any action against the arms is seen by the community not as a part of what could have been a bargaining chip.
Say, the Americans and the Saudis say, "Okay, we'll do the reconstruction. You have guarantees, you have everything, just give up your arms. Nobody's going to touch you." No, no. It does look, not by Hezbollah's interpretation, but by the actions of the other party that no guarantees are here, nothing is to be offered, we can't pressure Israel, we can only condemn its actions if there was a violation [on] its part. That's Tom Barrack's words as well. You have to give up your arms without any guarantees.
So the social dynamic inside the Hezbollah society went from—there were some people who actually were shocked after the war and said we might have to discuss this as an internal matter, we might give up some concessions in exchange for roles in the political [system]. That happened after the war when there was [talk] from the president and the prime minister, and before all this [disarmament proposal] started that, okay, we will reconstruct [the south], we'll guarantee your security. But then it went downhill from there.
There was no such thing as these talks. The government stopped condemning Israeli attacks. The population here does feel that it's isolated from the government, that it doesn't consider it as part of its people, and any other voices that we previously mentioned just ceased to exist because it seemed like a whole campaign against the Shia society here, that would cause its eradication and maybe, God forbid, its erasure.
To compare the strength between the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah, it's not only about arms, it's about [that] any action the government can take might lead to the dissolution of the army, or its division, because of the way the campaign is [pitting it] not against the political party but against the social component. So it's a very tense situation. They would use carrot and sticks, but instead they're using just sticks.
S: Can you go into more detail about the PR offensive you're describing? What have you been seeing in Lebanon trying to campaign for Hezbollah's disarmament in the media?
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